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RURAL DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
FOR DEVELOPING RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. MaJor efforts have been made the past two decades to develop and 
improve agricultural credit systems and expand the flow of loans to 
agriculture in low income countries <LICs>. During the past several 
years, aid agencies have provided over SU.S.5 billion dollars for 
rural financial market <RFM> proJects, and the volume of new 
agricultural loans in L!Cs was in excess of SU.S.30 billion per year 
in the early 1980s [Adams and Graham]. Foreign assistance has played 
a ma)or role in the design of RFM proJects, providing funds for 
on-lending, linking external funds to the provision of internal 
funds, and through technical assistance and training. The U.S. 
Agency for International Development <AID> has financed a number of 
these RFM proJects in several countries. 
2. Two sets of problems have emerged which suggest that the 
traditional approach to RFM pro)ects must be fundamentally 
restructured. First, many L!Cs now face difficulty in obtaining 
adequate foreign funds for economic development. It is increasingly 
clear that internally mobilized funds must substitute for external 
finance [Abbott: FAO <1984a,b>: Fry, <1984>: S. H. Kim]. External 
funds are not likely to be as abundant in the future as in the past: 
aid agencies face constraints on funds and commercial lenders are 
wary of increased lending to some LICs. Furthermore, the terms and 
conditions of both foreign assistance and commercial loans have 
hardened, and many countries must increase national savings to repay 
previous loans. The Latin American region faces the most serious 
savings challenge because net capital inflow actually turned negative 
in 1982 and 1983 [Caceres]. 
3. Second, even if external finance would be abundant, the 
traditional approach to RFM pro)ects is questioned because of the 
serious shortcomings now evident in many LICs. Most proJects have 
not lived up to expectations. The problems are so pervasive that the 
underlying assumptions on which the proJects are designed and 
implemented must be questioned. The substantial body 0£ research now 
available points to a new approach in the development of rural 
financial markets which is based on a greater reliance on savings 
mobilization as the source of funds for rural lending. 
4. The obJective of this paper is to summarJze the arguments made 
£or 1ncreas1ng rural deposit mob1l1zat1on in LICs. The main points 
can be summarized as follows: A maJor reason £or the failure of RFM 
proJects is that they are designed primarily to channel government 
and/or donor funds to targeted borrowers. Little attempt is made to 
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generate more reliable supplies of funds through deposit 
mobilization. Rural savers are denied secure and remunerative 
savings opportunities. Financial institutions must be strengthened 
to more effectively mobilize rural savings. To accomplish this task, 
policymakers must change priorities from pushing cheap credit to 
building viable rural £inancial inatitutiona. A reorientation in 
priorities will £acilitate making important policy changes such as 
the structure of administered interest rates. More emphasis on 
deposit mobilization should improve rural savings and the performance 
of financial institutions. Several technical issues must be faced 
when institutions broaden the range of financial services they 
offer. Strong central banks can facilitate the resolution of the 
challenges that will arise. The role of foreign assistance should 
change from providing large amounts of funds for on-lending to 
assisting countries make the adJustments associated with serious 
financial reform. 
5. Thia paper is divided into six sections as follows: Part II 
reviews key concepts of financial intermediation and rural finance. 
Part III summarizes assumptions and problems of RFM proJects. Part 
IV discusses the potential for and determinants of rural deposit 
mobilization. A discussion of the link between rural savings and the 
viability of financial institutions is presented in Part V. Part VI 
analizes the arguments made concerning controls over intersectoral 
resource flows. Part VII identifies some of the technical issues 
that governments and international agencies will need to confront in 
implementing financial reform. Part VIII presents some concluding 
comments. 
II. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND RURAL FINANCE 
6. RFM proJects are frequently designed considering only the farm 
level demand for credit, but rural households benefit from a variety 
of financial services. Ignoring the broader role of finance in 
economic development can lead to proJects which actually retard the 
development of the financial sector. It is useful, therefore, to 
summarize a few key financial concepts before discussing the 
specifics of RFM proJects. 
7. Financial intermediation is the process by which financial 
institutions mobilize savings from surplus units <households and 
£irms) and allocate them to deficit (borrowing> units. Surplus units 
save, and hence, reduce current consumption in order to increase 
£uture consumption. De£icit units obtain credit to do JUSt the 
opposite. Interest payments are incentives for surplus units to 
postpone consumption. Financial intermediation involves formal and 
informal institutions using various financial instruments. Moat LICa 
have relatively simple financial markets that increase in complexity 
as income levels rise. Financial intermediation in rural areas 
generally involves banks <commercial and specialized), postal savings 
offices, cooperatives, credit unions and a variety of informal 
. 
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intermediaries that utilize a small number 0£ deposit and savings 
instruments and legal documents £or £arm household loans. Government 
involvement in rural £inance has stressed the development 0£ 
credit-oriented, rather than savings. institutions. 
8. Many economists support Keynesian views that interest rates 
should be kept low to accelerate investment and accumulation 0£ 
capital. A markedly di££erent theoretical argument began to emerge 
with the attacks on financial repression in LICs by Shaw, McKinnon 
and others in the early 1970s. Whereas the Keynesian view emphasizes 
the impact 0£ interest rates on investment, the Shaw-McKinnon 
argument £ocuses on the impact 0£ interest rates and other controls 
on the supply 0£ £inance. They argue that the accumulation of real 
capital and the accumulation 0£ financial assets in developing 
economies are complementary rather than competitive. A comprehensive 
review of the original Shaw-McKinnon argument, subsequent refinements 
and related empirical studies can be found in Fry <1982). 
9. Financial repression refers to deliberate distortions of prices, 
including interest rates and £oreign exchange rates, that reduce the 
rate of growth and size of the financial sector relative to the rest 
of the economy. A repressed £inancial system is one with 
government-imposed ceilings on loan and deposit interest rates, 
foreign exchange controls, high reserve requirements, and lending 
quotas and targets. An expansion in lending to priority sectors and 
activities is encouraged through targeting of loans, preferential 
rediscount rates, regulations on approved types and sizes of loans, 
specifications on margin and collateral requirements, and the 
creation of specialized institutions such as development banks. 
Several countries have nationalized their banking systems to try to 
better achieve social obJectives. The result of these several types 
of government intervention is a financial system which is fragmented, 
segmented and restricted. Savers are generally penalized by low 
rates paid on deposits, while privileged groups of borrowers are 
favored with preferential credit terms. 
10. Debate continues over the relevance 0£ the Shaw-McKinnon argument 
and its implications for specific countries <for examples, see Gupta: 
Roe>. The rapid economic growth of Taiwan and South Korea following 
the introduction of financial reforms is often cited as support for 
the argument. Recent studies of several Asian LICs are also 
supportive by showing that raising real deposit rates increased 
financial savings, thereby improving credit availability [Abbott, Fry 
and Krishnaswarmy; Fry <1984)]. Furthermore, an increase in real 
depoeit rates increased the average efficiency of investment. These 
two e££ects contributed to raising the economic growth rate in these 
countries. 
11. In addition to a positive impact on ef£iciency and growth, 
improved financial intermediation can also make an important 
contribution to equity through both savings and lending activities. 
Consider the impact on savings of a reduction in financial repression 
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through raising both minimum lending and deposit rates. As discussed 
in Part IV. an increase in real deposit rates should stimulate 
financial savings by increasing incentives for postponing 
consumption.2 Since the number of depositors in any financial 
institution generally exceeds the number of borrowers, an increase in 
depaeit mobilization should benefit many saving households. 
Wealthier households have a variety of investment choices including 
both physical and financial assets. Poorer, leas sophisticated 
households, however, frequently have access only to financial 
investments. An increase in deposit rates can, therefore, make a 
positive impact on income distribution through ownership of savings 
instruments. 
12. An improvement in equity can also occur through lending. The 
lower that loan interest rates are set relative to equilibrium rates, 
the greater will be the excess demand for loans and the need for 
lenders to impose nonprice loan rationing through noninterest terms 
of the loan contract and the size of loan granted [Bhatt and Roe; 
Gonzalez-Vega (1984a)J. When interest rates are suppressed, loans 
become concentrated among wealthy borrowers who can meet high 
collateral requirements and who can use political influence to obtain 
loans. Poor borrowers without influence and collateral but with high 
rate-of-return investment proJects are crowded out and are denied 
loans. Raising loan rates restores interest as the loan rationing 
mechanism. Poor borrowers have a better chance of getting loans and 
low rate-of-return proJects are eliminated. This is the mechanism 
through which an increase in investment efficiency occurs, and it can 
also contribute to a more equitable distribution of loans. 
13. Agricultural specialists are frequently preoccupied with the 
credit "needs" of farm households. There is seldom recognition that 
financial services can provide several benefits to farm households 
(Adams <1984a)J. First, monetization can make it leas expensive for 
the farm household to meet obligations by transferring resources 
through a check or bank draft rather than through the transfer 0£ 
physical assets. Second, resource allocation may be more efficient 
because a financial institution can facilitate resource transfers 
between surplus and deficit units separated too far by time and 
distance to engage effectively in direct exchange. Third, financial 
institutions can provide a credit reserve use£ul to farmers facing 
risk. By having access to a ready supply of loans, farmers can take 
the risk of committing more of their own funds to investment. 
Fourth, an intermediary can help a household accumulate savings to 
combine, perhaps, with a future loan to finance a large investment. 
Fifth. financial institutions help with .intergenerational transfers 
of claims on resources. 
14. The heterogeneity of farm households is widely acknowledged in 
terms 0£ the types and sizes of £arms for which RFM pro)ects are 
appropriate [Donald, p.lSJ, the ability 0£ institutions to meet rural 
credit demands [FAO {1981a),p.4J, and the credit needs of different 
groups of farmers CFAO <198lb, p.14J. Differences among farm 
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households in wealth, income, access to land and size of landholding 
are important, but the heterogeneity in household cash £low is even 
more important for financial intermediation [Meyer and AlicbusanJ. 
This heterogeneity arises because of di££erences in cropping 
patterns, enterprise combinations, procurement and marketing 
strategies, consumption patterns, and family li£e cycles. RFM 
proJects often assume that, because of crop seasonality, most 
households will experience cash flow surpluses and deficits at 
approximately the same time of the year. However, detailed cash flow 
studies in LICs show that patterns of income and expenditures in £arm 
households are more complicated. The fact that some households 
experience surpluses at the time that others face deficits provides 
opportunities for rural financial intermediation. Since some 
surpluses are sizeable and exist £or an extended period of time, many 
farm households could effectively use loans and saving services to 
help synchronize income and expenditures. Furthermore, some 
households are continuous net savers and find long-term financial 
investments attractive. 
15. Until recently, most RFM proJects have been designed as credit 
proJects to push farm loans, frequently at subsidized rates, and the 
savings mobilization side of financial intermediation has been 
forgotten or deemphasized [Vogel Cl984a>l. The central obJective has 
been to improve production and farm incomes. This strategy has been 
complementary with the development 0£ pro)ects which JUstify a cheap 
credit component to speed farmer adoption. The result is that both 
RFM and integrated pro)ects, as traditionally designed, contribute to 
fragmentation of financial markets. A few borrowers monopolize the 
subsidized credit, the lending institutions are drained of their 
£inancial viability, and nonpriority borrowers are forced to pay 
rates that are higher than would prevail without financial 
repression. 
16. The design of traditional proJects has been based on faulty 
assumptions; the consequences for efficient rural financial 
intermediation are well-documented and will only be summarized here 
(Adams and Graham; Adams, Graham and Von Pischke; APO; Donald; 
Howell; Inter-American Development Bank; Von Pischke, Adams and 
Donald] • Common assumptions about £armer-borrowers are that they are 
highly risk averse, will resist adoption of innovations unless bribed 
by low interest rate loans. will misappropriate loans unless they are 
given in kind rather than cash and will not repay loans unless 
pledged with collateral or subJect to the pressure of group lending. 
Surprisingly. these assumptions imply irrationality in the use of 
£inance even though the concept of peasant rationality became 
well-established with the seminal work 0£ Theodore W. Schultz in 
1964. These assumptions lead to targeting 0£ loans £or speci£ic 
borrowers; detailed specification of sanctioned loan uses and 
amounts; elaborate procedures for in-kind lending, loan disbursement 
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and supervision; and required collateral substitutes like group 
lending or compulsory marketing schemes. Maximum lending rates are 
set below market equilibrium with subsidies provided by governments 
or international agencies through favorable rediscount arrangements 
or direct credit lines. Loan interest rates for small £armers and 
other disadvantaged groups are £requently set at rates lower than for 
other borrowers. It is expected that low-income households will be 
pulled out 0£ their poverty by properly adopting the recommended 
investment-credit-production package. It is also expected that 
subsidized credit will o££set production disincentives caused by high 
input prices or low product prices. 
17. Assumptions about the behavior 0£ rural savers and £ormal lenders 
also influence the design of traditional RFM pro)ects. Rural 
households are assumed to be either too poor to save or indi££erent 
to rewards £or saving. Lenders, therefore, cannot mobilize rural 
deposits in a cost-e££ective manner and must receive subsidized funds 
for on-lending. Furthermore, commercial banks are risk averse and 
will not make socially desirable amounts of loans to £armers unless 
enticed or compelled to do so. Commercial banks may be nationalized 
and/or complemented with specialized development banks to increase 
£~rm lending. Since in£ormal lenders are assumed to charge usurious 
rates and gobble up assets pledged to them, formal sources must be 
expanded to force down interest rates or, better yet, drive in£ormal 
lenders out of business. 
18. Some positive outcomes can be associated with traditional credit 
proJects: the aggregate amount 0£ agricultural loans has increased in 
some countries, commercial banks have increased their technical 
capacity to make farm loans, some farmers have received large amounts 
of loans and the expansion in use of mechanization, new seed 
varieties, fertilizers, chemicals and new cropping systems is 
attributed to increased lending in some areas. However, serious 
problems in many countries have led to a reassessment of traditional 
views about agricultural credit. Changes in the farm level use and 
distribution of loans have fallen far short of expectations. Some 
estimates suggest that still only about 15 percent of Asian and Latin 
American farmers and no moz·e than 5 percent of African farmers have 
had access to institutional credit. The ratio 0£ agricultural loans 
to agricultural GNP and the ~atio of agricultural loans to total 
loans have o£ten risen very slowly, if at all. All too frequently_ 
donor funds have simply substituted £or domestic sources with little 
net impact on total volume of agricultural loans. 
19. Agricultural loans are o£ten heavily concentrated in the hands of 
a few wealthy farm households (Gonzalez-Vega (1984b>: Vogel 
<1984b>J. Even in the exceptional case 0£ Brazil, where the 
agricultural credit to agricultural production ratio grew from 0.2 in 
the mid 1960s to almost 1.0 by the mid 1970s, it was difficult to 
increase the volume of loans going to smsll £armers and poorer 
regions CAraUJO and Meyer: Meyer et all. Interest subsidies on loans 
equal billions 0£ U.S. dollars and rapresent 20 to 30 percent 0£ 
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agricultural production in some cases [Sayad; Vogel <1984b>J. The 
concentration of loans and subsidies, the impact on incomes due to 
leverage obtained from loans, and the concentration of loan 
delinquencies have seriously aggravated the distribution of rural 
incomes and wealth [Adams and Meyer]. 
20. Farmers continue to rely on informal loans. The reasons include 
the high borrowing (interest and noninterest) costs of formal loans 
caused by credit rationing [Ahmed: LadmanJ, the high value that 
farmers place on maintaining good relations with dependable informal 
sources relative to undependable formal sources, the convenience of 
informal sourcee and their responsiveness to customer needs CHolstJ • 
and the linkage between land and credit in traditional land tenure 
arrangements (Braverman and Srinivasan]. 
21. Although many attempts have been made, it is impossible to 
satisfactorily quantify the impact of increased agricultural loans on 
farm household production, income and choice of technology [David and 
Meyer]. Many factors other than credit affect differences in 
economic performance between borrowers and nonborrowers. Funds are 
fungible so it is difficult, if not impossible, to effectively target 
loans. The additional agricultural production and investment 
associated with increased loans is usually much less than expected 
because of diversion and substitution of funds. Due to the 
methodological problems of farm level credit impact studies, it is 
more useful to evaluate the impact of RFM pro]ects on supply of funds 
and institutional viability. 
22. Many financial institutions are experiencing problems even more 
serious than those at the farm level. Few institutions are readily 
expanding their agricultural loan portfolios, most loans are still 
short-term and rigid collateral requirements are in effect. Actual 
loan allocations often differ so greatly from targets that the value 
of credit planning and programming is seriously questioned [Vogel and 
Larson]. Many financial institutions are essentially bankrupt and 
exist only through government or external subsidies. Accrued 
interest on delinquent loans <£requently with little probability of 
being repaid) represents a large portion 0£ reported income. Other 
methods to "cook the books" are used t.o disguise the viability 
problem and prevent a cut-off of foreign funds. Institutional 
recycling is common. An institution is created with great fanfare 
and a large infusion 0£ funds. Because 0£ high loan transactions 
costs, inflation and loan defaults, the real value of the initial 
capital eventually disappears. The institution is subsequently 
renamed or merged with another institution, another inJection of 
capital is provided and the cycle starts again. 
23. The minimum interest spread between cost of funds and lending 
rates necessary to ensure financial viability is high. 
Intermediation costs are naturally high in LICs because of low 
volume, inefficiency, and poorly developed systems of transportation, 
communications and information in rural area$, but traditional RFM 
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pro)ects also raise costs through loan targeting. Dozens 0£ 
individual agricultural credit lines and proJects have been developed 
in many countries. Although the cost 0£ funds lent may be low, total 
lending costs £or institutions may be two or three times as high £or 
loan-targeted programs compared to other credit lines because 0£ the 
high administrative overheads required (Cuevas and Graham <1984a)J. 
The interest spreads authorized may be £ar below costs. thereby 
discouraging lender participation. Lenders reduce lending costs and 
ration loans by transferring part of their transactions costs to 
borrowers. Borrowing costs tend to be highest £or small loans, poor 
borrowers, borrowers 0£ targeted loan programs. and first-time 
borrowers 0£ an institution. High borrowing costs £or formal loans 
encourages informal borrowing [Cuevas and Graham <1984b>J. Some 
institutions lack the motivation and means to reduce transactions 
costs [Bhattl, but spend much effort to avoid regulations that work 
against market forces CKaneJ • 
24. Low loan repayment rates also drain institutional viability. 
[Boakye-Dankwa; World Bank]. The situation is worse than the 
reported data imply because 0£ the widespread re£inancing of old 
unpaid loans. Borrower inability and unwillingness to repay have 
been identified as maJor loan recovery problems, but poor collection 
procedures may be more important in some institutions CMaharJan, 
Loohawenchit, and Meyer]. The disastrous consequences 0£ low loan 
recovery have been analyzed [Von Pischke <1981>]. Funds are 
unavailable for recycling. collection costs rise. staff may become 
demoralized, respect £or contracts declines, and institutions become 
vulnerable to political interference over who receives and who repays 
loans. Defaulting borrowers may be denied future access to financial 
aervicee so their loans become one-shot income transfers. rather than 
the first step in developing a long-term relationship with a 
financial institution. 
25. Finally, inflation destroys institutions because inflation rates 
are often high and variable while administered interest rates on 
loans and deposits are low and inflexible. Real deposit rates are 
often negative and, all too frequently, so are lending rates. 
Because operating costs, delinquency rates and inflation are high, 
institutional viability usually requires lending rates in excess of 
twenty percent, but many governments find that charging such rates is 
inconsistent with their cheap credit obJectives. 
IV. RURAL DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION 
26. Critics 0£ traditional RFM proJects argue that a fundamental 
reorientation must occur with greater emphasis placed on rural 
deposit mobilization. By pushing credit to farmers at cheap rates 
and supplying funds £or on-lending, governments and donors create 
conditions that destroy institutional viability, discourage deposit 
mobilization and deny rural households good opportunities £or 
financial savings. The ability ~£ RFMs to expand is dependent on 
.- . 
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government funds, and this is an important reason why governments 
have eagerly embraced donor sponsored RFM proJecta. Deposit 
mobilization must expand i£ LICs are to break their dependence on 
£oreign savings and if RFMa are to perform more effectively. 
27. The paradox in many LICs is that although it is common wisdom 
that agriculture must provide resources for other sectors during the 
early stages 0£ development, £ew countries aggressively attempt to 
mobilize rural deposits. Five points must be emphasized regarding 
rural savings potential. First, all households save no matter how 
poor, even i£ in small amounts £or short periods 0£ time. Abstention 
£rom consumption is normal and necessary £or survival even i£ the 
interval before consumption is £airly short [Von Pischke <1983>]. 
Second, £armers save automatically. When production and consumption 
cycles are not synchronized, farmers regularly store some produce for 
consumption until the next harvest. Alternatively, they may choose 
to sell their harvest, pay past debts or expand consumption, and 
borrow be£ore the next harvest [Bouman]. Third, since rural 
households are heterogeneous, the possibility exists for institutions 
to mobilize funds from households with surpluses to channel to those 
with deficits. Fourth, while some rural areas are growing at slow 
rates and barely keep up with population growth, other areas are 
experiencing rapid changes in enterprises and technology. Rapid 
income growth due to technological change can increase rural 
consumption, savings and investment [Mellor]. Indian data show that 
savings/investment ratios in better-irrigated, more rapidly 
innovating regions were up to 3 to 15 times the all-Indian average 
[Krishna and Raychaudhuril. Fifth, foreign remittances o££er new 
savings potential £or several countries. Some countries have been 
£airly successful at mobilizing these remittances, but much remains 
to be done. A recent study in Pakistan showed that much of the 
SU.S.2 billion received in annual remittances went to rural areas, 
but only 1.5 percent were channelled into financial assets [Jetha, 
Akhtar and Rao) . 
28. Analysts have identified many determinants of household savings 
behavior [Oell'Amore: Ligeti; Mottura; Von Pischke <1983>]. There is 
often conceptual con£usion over the distinction between savings, 
defined as abstinence £rom consumption, and £inancial aaaete, which 
represent one £orm 0£ holding a stock of savings. The decision to 
hold financial assets may or may not af£ect aggregate savings. 
Recent research makes a care£ul distinction between aggregate savings 
and financial assets, and tests the substitutability among forms of 
savings [Fry <1984>; Gupta]. Relatively more research has been done 
on the factors that a££ect aggregate savings than on the determinants 
0£ £inancial assets. 
29. Political and economic stability are important for any economic 
activity. The threat 0£ revolution, unrest, expropriation, and 
disruptions in production raise the risk premium on capital and 
encourage private capital flight and investment in unproductive 
assets such as gold [Dell'Amore; Wachtel]. In£lation and economic 
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stability in the relation between domestic and foreign currencies 
affect the choice of currency held and place a high risk premium on 
the required return to savings. The degree of monetization is an 
important factor affecting rural deposit mobilization CChandavarkar 
<1977>]. Both subsistence and barter are declining in many rural 
economies, but poor markets, high inflation, and political and 
economic uncertainty encourage rural households to hold excess crops, 
livestock and other physical assets. 
30. One generally accepted proposition is that savings are positively 
related to income, but there is wide disagreement about the exact 
relationship between savings <marginal and average) and current 
income, past income, income growth and characteristics 0£ households 
[Mikesell and Zinser]. The relationships are complex enough to 
preclude the speci£ication of a savings £unction related to per 
capita output as the single independent variable. Higher income 
households clearly have a greater capacity to save and should have a 
higher average propensity to save. Furthermore, higher income 
households may hold higher transactions balances in financial 
institutions and prefer asset portfolios with combinations 0£ 
financial and physical assets. As their financial assets increase in 
absolute amount, the per unit transactions costs of making and 
withdrawing deposits should £all, thereby increasing the real rate of 
return. On the other hand, higher income households may have greater 
access to a wider range 0£ investment alternatives and be more 
sensitive to low returns earned from financial assets. Lower income 
households have fewer options to invest in physical assets and may 
choose to hold a relatively larger proportion of their assets in 
financial forms. 
31. There is considerable debate over the influence 0£ interest rates 
on savings. An increase in interest rates may stimulate savings by 
making current consumption expensive in terms of future consumption 
<substitution effect>, or may lower savings by reducing the amount of 
present savings necessary for a given level 0£ future consumption 
<income effect>. The available evidence suggests the substitution 
effect is more important, but not overwhelmingly so CLanyi and 
Saracoglul • The important issue for financial intermediation in LICs 
is the relationship between rates 0£ interest paid on deposits and 
savings in £inancial forms. Advocates £or higher rates argue that 
peasants are economically rational in their financial affairs, and 
even poor households need and benefit from attractive deposit and 
savings services. They £eel that countries (such as Taiwan and South 
Korea) have mobilized surprisingly large amounts 0£ rural savings 
when deposit rates were changed substantially, while rural savings 
have been depressed in other countries because real deposit rates 
have been highly negative due to high inflation rates [Adams <1984c>; 
Benoit: Mittendorf]. Additional evidence on rural deposit potential 
is £ound in rehabilitation proJects £or rural savings institutions 
that successfully mobilized large amounts 0£ deposits when interest 
rates were raised and other incentives were given to savers 
[Gonzalez-Vega Cl984c>: Poyo: Vogel C1984a>l. Fry <1984> and Gupta 
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found that financial deposits responded more to real interest rates 
than did national savings due to the substitution of financial 
investments for other investments. It appears, therefore, that 
deposit rates are of more direct importance for financial 
intermediation than they are for aggregate savings. 
32. Transactions costs are important because they influence the net 
return obtained £rom any given interest rate. These coats for rural 
savers include the explicit coata 0£ photographs, passbooks, travel 
costs, and other cash costs 0£ making deposits. Many institutions 
also require complicated procedures £or the withdrawal 0£ savings. 
Implicit costs include traveling and waiting time to make deposits 
and withdrawals. Few empirical studies are available, but it is 
expected that high transaction costs discourage savers, particularly 
those with small accounts. Besides explicit regulations on minimum 
size deposits, it is argued that financial institutions impose high 
transactions costs to discourage small accounts. Conversely, 
institutions can easily reduce transactions costs for preferred 
customers by simplifying or speeding up some procedures or 
requirements. 
33. The proximity of deposit-taking institutions may be the most 
important factor affecting customer access to and transactions costs 
for financial services. Strong incentives have been given by some 
LIC governments to expand bank branches into rural areas [Kwarteng; 
Meyer and Esguerra]. Progress has been uneven, however, so 
additional branch expansion is frequently recommended [FAO <1984b, 
1981a)]. The incentives for branching have sometimes led to 
uneconomic operations and uneven distribution with too many branches 
in some regions and too £ew in others. Mobile banks and part-time 
offices have been tried in some countries, but more effort is 
required to design methods which bring cost-effective financial 
services closer to rural households. Private voluntary agencies in 
some countries form groups of poor households to engage in small 
saving and borrowing activities but more analysis is required to 
determine if this is a cost-effective alternative for formal 
financial institutions. 
34. Another important factor expected to affect rural deposits is the 
linkage between savings and lending. Many analysts believe that an 
important reason £or rural households to hold deposits is the 
possibility 0£ eventually getting a loan. This implies that 
institutions should link savings mobilization with lending, but in 
practice many rural financial institutions are single £unction. 
Savings mobilization activities were expanded in Africa during the 
1970s through the creation of new savings institutions and 
transformation of post office savings banks into savings and credit 
banks. Achievements were made in tapping the vast savings potential, 
but progress has lagged in the development of lending activities 
[Mauri]. On the other hand, few specialized lending institutions in 
many LICs mobilize signi£icant amounts of rural deposits. 
Specialization in only one side of financial intermediation appears 
" . 
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to be inappropriate for two reasons; one is that the motivation for 
savings is destroyed when the link is broken between savings and 
loans, and the second is because 0£ operational e££1ciency, which 
will be discussed in the next section. 
35. Finally, a wide variety of social factors influence deposit 
mobilization in rural areas. Some countries need to £ind alternative 
methods to reward savers because of religious opposition to the 
concept 0£ interest. Group saving may be an important approach in 
some areas where rural people are skeptical of £ormal institutions or 
are frightened of dealing with bank staff. In many countries it is 
believed that women control household finances and frequently old, 
widowed or divorced women hold large amounts of liquid savings. 
Customs may require that they limit their business dealings to other 
women so female employees may be required in financial institutions 
to serve female customers. 
V. RURAL SAVINGS AND INSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY 
36. Mobilization of rural savings may be an expensive undertaking for 
formal financial institutions. Encouraging lending institutions to 
mobilize more rural deposits would seem to exacerbate their already 
serious financial problems, making them even more unviable. Although 
mobilizing more rural deposits could increase institutional coats, 
there are reasons to expect that costs will actually decline. 
Increased rural deposit mobilization may also contribute to 
institutional viability by improving loan repayment. 
!D§t~t~t!9~~1_g9~~~ 
37. Growth in deposits relative to other sources of funds would seem 
to increase an institution's average coat of funds. First, the 
liabilities of many institutions currently operating in rural areas 
are mainly composed of subsidized or "cheap" sources of funds. These 
funds are available through interest-free government deposits, direct 
capital investments. special rediscount provisions, targeted lines of 
credit, and obligatory deposits of commercial banks that fail to meet 
lending quotas. Specialized lending institutions, in particular, 
rely on these sources of funds (Bourne and Graham]. Second, creating 
an extensive rural branch network to mobilize deposits appears to be 
expensive. Even if rural savings are more plentiful than normally 
assumed. the administrative costs of full-service rural bank branches 
might be excessive. 
38. Recent research suggests that "cheap" funds are more expensive 
for institutions than they appear, while deposits may not be as 
expensive as feared for institutions engaging in both deposit 
mobilization and lending. It is frequently assumed that 
specialization in economic activities leads to increased efficiency 
in resource use, but there appear to be important qualifications to 
this rule for financial institutions. The cost-complementarities 
that financial intermediaries can attain through the provision of 
... 
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multiple services suggest that economies of scope may be more 
important than economies of scale. An empirical test of this 
proposition was conducted in Honduras by comparing the cost structure 
of a commercial bank with the Agricultural Development Bank <ADS) 
CCuevael. The results showed that the ADB could moAt efficiently 
expand by mobilizing more deposits. while the commercial bank could 
most efficiently expand by increasing agricultural lending. Lending 
costs were less than 3 percent for the commercial bank. but more than 
8 percent £or the ADB. Part 0£ this difference was due to larger 
average size loans in the commercial bank and part was due to source 
0£ funds. The ADB mobilized only about 40 percent 0£ its funds 
compared to over 90 percent for the commercial bank. The ADB 
operation was more centralized and expensive because 0£ the reporting 
requirements £or special credit lines and external funds. An 
analysis 0£ the commercial bank branches showed that even though the 
size 0£ loans was much higher. lending costs £or donor-funded loans 
were almost 8 percent compared to a range 0£ 1 to 6 percent £or loans 
made with the bank's own funds. Increasing mobilized funds and 
reducing participation in donor-sponsored programs is very 
cost-e££ective in this type 0£ situation [Cuevas and Graham <1984a)J. 
39. Screening loan applicants is one of the important functions that 
increases lending costs. The ADB in Honduras spent proportionately 
more that the commercial bank on loan monitoring and supervision in 
an attempt to channel loans to targeted purposes [Graham and 
Cuevas). Institutions that both mobilize deposits and make loans 
have important advantages in loan screening because they frequently 
have additional information about the loan applicant. They may be 
familiar with the applicant's cash flow, savings habits and wealth, 
which contributes to better lending decisions. Furthermore, during 
the life 0£ the loan, changes in a borrower's deposits and savings 
can serve as an early warning about potential future loan repayment 
problems. 
40. A £inal £actor that can influence coats and returns 0£ financial 
institutions is their ability to develop local loan programs. When 
an institution limits its lending to targeted programs, it must 
follow regulations on authorized sizes and types of loans, amount to 
lend each borrower. disbursement and repayment schedules, and 
collateral requirements. For some borrowers. these regulations are 
too liberal for sound banking procedures. On the other hand, some 
applicants with good debt repayment capacity and proven repayment 
records are denied loans because their proJects are not included in 
the targeted programs. When lenders mobilize their own resources, 
they can develop loan programs that simultaneously conform closer to 
their lending standards and supply the needs 0£ local £armers and 
communities. 
~~!~-~~~~y~~~ 
41. For many institutions, loan recovery is the moat serious threat 
to viability. Administrative costs may be reduced through effective 
management, but an institution will still £ail if it loses 20 to 30 
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percent of its assets each year through loan de£ault. It is 
impossible to pass losses 0£ this magnitude on to repaying borrowers 
through higher interest rates. Furthermore, if delinquency and 
default reach visible enough proportions, the demonstration effect on 
other borrowers can result in no one repaying on time. This problem 
ia underestimated by analysts who argue that moat loans are 
eventually repaid. Such logic obscures the fact that, first, slow 
repayment and non-repayment reduce an institution's ability to 
recycle funds to other worthy borrowers; second, loan collection 
activities raise administrative costs and the spread required between 
deposit and lending rates; and, third, high inflation rates found in 
many countries destroy the real value of postponed loan repayments. 
42. Increased rural deposit mobilization can improve loan recovery 
for two reasons. The first reason is the psychological factor 
associated with the willingness of borrowers to repay. When funds 
are provided by donors or the government, they frequently become 
identified with gifts or grants, and borrowers assume they need not 
be repaid or that few effective sanctions will be imposed for 
nonrepayment. If loan funds are drawn from savings made by members 
of the community, the willingness of borrowers to repay is often 
dramatically increased. The use of local savings, thus, promotes 
borrower responsibility EDeguefeJ. 
43. The second reason is that attitudes of lenders towards loan 
recovery are also likely to change when the source of funds changes. 
Specialized credit institutions often consider loan recovery of 
lesser importance than lending. They spend relatively less effort on 
loan collection because incentives are greater for meeting lending 
targets (Graham and Cuevas; NyaninJ. Some donor-sponsored programs, 
for example, impose penalties if lending targets are not met. When 
lenders assume £armers will not repay, and they take little action to 
collect, borrowers confirm the assumptions by not repaying. Loan 
records are so disorganized in some institutions that it is difficult 
to know exactly who owes how much and when it was due. Yet, a study 
in Nepal showed that collection e££orts were more important in 
explaining loan repayment than farm income and other variables 
[Mahar Jan, Loohawenchit, and Meyer]. Lenders will become more 
concerned about collections and accountability when a> deposits are 
an important source of funds lent, b) lending volume depends on 
recovery of past loans, c) incentives are given for mobilizing,. 
depoe~te, and d> the sa£ety of savers' deposits requires closer 
scrutiny of lending activities and institutional operations. 
44. Political intrusion in lending is hard to avoid because 0£ the 
benefits that borrowers obtain from additional liquidity. The 
opportunity for political interference increases in subsidized credit 
programs because low interest rates cause an excess demand for loans 
(Gonzalez-Vega <1984all. The greater the subsidy, the more valuable 
the loan is to borrowers, and the greater the temptation to use 
in£luence, bribery and other means to obtain a loan. When loans are 
made from deposits mobilized locally, the potential £or political 
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intrusion declines because lenders can more easily allocate loans 
solely on the rate-of-return of a proJect and debt repayment capacity 
and integrity of the borrower. Bribery and corruption should also 
decline when lenders become more aggressive in seeking borrowers for 
the expanded funds available to lend from mobilized resources. 
Borrower·s may feel little need to repay loans "bought" through br ibea 
so as co~ruption declines, loan recovery should also improve. 
VI. INTERSECTORAL FLOW OF FUNDS 
45. Increased deposit mobilization will raise the question of what to 
do with deposited funds. There is great concern in many LICs about 
the uses of mobilized funds, and rules and regulations are designed 
to prevent financial institutions from "siphoning 0££ 11 local funds 
and channelling them into urban areas or into other rural areas. 
Several aspects about the role of financial institutions in 
intersectoral resource transfers need to be clarified. First, 
financial institutions often Just implement the decisions of 
households and firms to transfer resources, so the reasons for these 
decisions must be analyzed [Chandavarkar (1981)). Second, even 
within the financial system, the direction of net flows is not 
straightforward. Rural entrepreneurs may hold their deposits in 
rural branches while borrowing from urban branches. Third, both the 
supply and demand conditions for rural loans must be evaluated if 
rural institutions lend less than is socially desirable. Fourth, the 
existence of a reliable rural lending institution can provide a 
credit reserve that encourages farmers to commit more of their own 
resources for investment and use their borrowing capacity to meet 
emergencies [Baker and BhargavaJ. The impact of financial 
institutions on rural investment may, therefore, be greater than 
their reported loans. Fifth, a financial institution has the 
obligation to generate high and safe returns £or depositors. I£ 
institutions fail to do so, they will lose the confidence of their 
customers. Quotas, targeted-lending programs and other policies that 
attempt to hold resources in rural areas may Jeopardize depositors by 
increasing the risks and decreasing the returns to financial 
institutions. 
46. Far too much emphasis has been placed on forcing or enticing 
institutions to lend, and far too little concern has been given to 
demand for loans. Expanded rural savings mobilization will not only 
provide important savings benefits to rural people, but it will also 
increase the demand £or loans for several reasons. The first reason 
is that loan demand will likely rise because some households will 
increase savings, believing they will be eligible for a loan at a 
later date CCausae]. Some 0£ these households will gain the 
confidence of institutions through saving and will be granted loans. 
Secondly, rural people will develop confidence in the dependability 
of an institution that serves their long-term financial needs by 
providing a secure place £or deposits and making loans. Specialized 
lending institutions in many LICs are very undependable sources of 
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loans because of the wide swings they suffer in availability of funds 
[Bourne and Graham]. Third. the potential exists for expanding loan 
demand by reducing borrowing coats. The structure of administered 
interest rates must be changed to allow flexibility that will give 
lenders more scope for reducing borrowing costs. A Honduras study 
found that interest rates and borrower transaction coats were 
negatively related, suggesting that lenders absorb more 
administrative coats and simplify procedures when interest ratee are 
higher (Cuevas and Graham tl984b>J. Thia result was particularly 
significant for emall loans. When lenders reduce borrowing coats, 
farmers are encouraged to borrow more from formal sources. 
47. Long-term farm profitability is frequently ignored in analyses of 
the demand for and supply of farm loans. Many LICs have cheap food 
policies that undervalue agricultural products in order to promote 
industrialization. Input subsidies, public investments in research. 
extension and irrigation, and cheap credit are means to offset the 
adverse effects of such policies. The penalization of agriculture is 
not fully compensated. however, because the subsidies are usually 
relatively small and only a few farmers benefit from them (David; 
Ray]. Cheap credit cannot compensate for price and technology 
problems that result in low factor productivity (Pollard and 
Heffernan]. The diversion and substitution of loan funds in targeted 
programs is likely to be high when sanctioned loan purposes produce 
low returns compared to other farm and nonfarm activities (Graham and 
Pollard]. Frequent changes in agricultural pricing and subsidy 
policies have discouraged farm investments by increasing farmer 
uncertainty about future profits. Successful rural savings programs 
have been linked to well-defined agricultural technical packages that 
uae the largest part of the savings (Mittendorf]. Funds are invested 
in rural areas when investors feel there are good potential 
investments, but flow out when the returns on investments are higher 
elsewhere. 
48. Policy makers can do several things to ensure that more rural 
deposits stay in rural areas. They can increase the rate of return 
£or agricultural investments through changes in price policies. 
agricultural technology and markets. They can introduce stable 
policies to decrease risks and uncertainties faced by farmers. These 
changes will have more long-term impact on farmer demand for loans 
and lender willingness to lend, than further efforts to push the 
supply of loans. They can also give lenders more flexibility and 
incentives to make innovations and create loan programs to meet local 
needs. For example. the distinction between production and 
consumption loans must be reevaluated [IFADl. Large farmers are 
permitted to borrow to cover production coats, including labor 
payments that are spent by workers for family consumption, but small 
farmers are not permitted to borrow for their family consumption 
needs. Nonfarm enterprises and rural nonfarm firms are often denied 
loans even though they provide much employment and income [Meyer; 
Kilby, Liedholm and Meyer]. Lenders must be encouraged to make loans 
based on debt repayment capacity and borrower integrity and move away 
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from rigid standards for sanctioned production and consumption 
activities. 
VII. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IMPLEMENTING FINANCIAL REFORMS 
49. Mobilizing more rural savings canl help reduce dependence on 
foreign assistance and improve performance of RFMs in LICs. 
Comprehensive changes must be made in rural financial institut1one 
and in government policies and programs, however, if rural deposit 
mobilization is to be successful. Information now available on recent 
AID proJects to strengthen rural deposit mobilization and broaden 
financial institutions in Jamaica, Peru, Honduras, the Dominican 
Republic and Bangladesh suggest the following factors are important 
for success [Gonzalez-Vega <1984c>; Graham and Connally; Poyo; Vogel 
< 1984a > J • 
~9~~~~~~~~-~9!!s!~~-~~9-~~9g~~~~ 
50. The first step in financial reform is the requirement that 
governments must shift priorities from pushing cheap credit for 
farmers to building viable financial systems. They can then begin to 
design ways to improve deposit mobilization. A revision in rural 
deposit interest rates will be a necessary step in many LICs because 
interest rates for deposits frequently must be increased to mobilize 
more savings. Interest rates on farm loans will also have to be 
raised to permit an increase in interest spreads so institutions can 
cover costs. Flexibility in interest rates is required to ad1ust for 
variability in inflation. The rate structure and the extent to which 
markets are permitted to determine rates will vary from country to 
country. "Optimum" rates are difficult to determine, but 
policymakers should evaluate the structure of nominal interest rates 
compared to real interest rates, world interest rates, rates of 
return on investments, the spread between savings and lending rates, 
and interest rates in informal credit markets <Pereira Leite>. 
Maintaining rates that are normally positive in real terms will be a 
minimum standard for moat LICa. Alternatives to interest rates must 
be provided in countries where religious beliefs discourage explicit 
payment 0£ interest. 
51. Governments need a strong institutional £ramework for stimulating 
and monitoring the financial sector. This responsibility often must 
fall on the central bank. Some LICs need to create a central 
monetary authority, while others should strengthen their existing 
central bank. Instead 0£ emphasizing rural credit supplies, the 
primary role 0£ the central bank should be to oversee the development 
of viable rural financial institutions. Several technical issues 
must be resolved, and the central bank is the logical government 
agency to provide leadership for the following tasks. 
~~-Q~~~!2E_~~-~EE~2~~!~~~-~!~_2;_~~~~!_f!~~~~!~!_!~~~!~~~!2~~~ 
It is unlikely that a single type of rural financial institution will 
be optimal for all LICs. Each country must develop a mix 0£ 
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institutions consistent with its particular needs with emphasis on 
two criteria for institutional development. First, multifunctional 
institutions that link savings and credit activities should be 
expanded. This involves strengthening the lending activities of 
specialized savings institutions and the savings mobilization 
activities of specialized lenders. Second, a range of institutional 
forms must be provided to meet the needs of specific rural markets. 
A network of full-service bank branches may be appropriate for 
semi-urban areas, while simpler institutions may be sufficient £or 
smaller isolated areas. Some institutions may be encouraged to 
retail financial services in unbanked areas but offer only wholesale 
services where other local retailers are operating efficiently. 
Incentives should be given to institutions for testing the efficiency 
of alternative forms of financial services in rural areas. Links 
between formal and informal institutions should be explored. 
~~-tQ§1~~-~~9-~~9~!~~~-~Q~E~~!~!Q~~ Expanding multifunctional 
rural financial institutions opens up possibilities for increased 
competition and efficiency in the provision of financial services. A 
trade-off exists between competition and economies of scale 
CKhatkhate and RiechelJ. Restricting competition may permit a few 
institutions to achieve economies of scale, but may also encourage 
monopoly powers that prevent desired reductions in prices of 
financial services. Competition may be encouraged at the national 
level, but restrained in specific rural areas due to small market 
size. Central bank rules that authorize the creation of new 
financial institutions, sanction specific services, and regulate 
branching must be applied with caution because of their impact on 
competition and economies of scale and scope. 
g~-~§§!§t_~!th_!!9~!9!;y_~~9-~!~~-~~~~9~~~~~-~ Operating risks 
for institutions may decline when they increase their scope 0£ 
£inancial services, but there are also ways in which liquidity and 
risk management problems will increase. Specialized lending 
institutions, dependent upon reliable government or donor funds, may 
find that deposits are more volatile and difficult to manage as a 
substitute source of funds. Specialized savings institutions may £ind 
that the risk of their asset portfolios increases with agricultural 
lending. Even though lenders broaden the range of" activities funded 
in rural areas, loan portfolios composed only of loans for farm 
related enterprises may represent more risk than those diversified 
across several economic sectors. The central bank must explore 
methods that help institutions manage risk and liquidity problems 
such as interbank lending agreements, occasional rediscounting 
£aailit1ea, and loan guarantee and insurance programs. Reserve 
requirements must be flexible and ad]usted in response to changes in 
liquidity positions. Rules on debt to equity requirements for rural 
institutions must be stringent enough to encourage capitalization for 
possible loan losses, yet liberal enough so institutions can increase 
income through greater leverage. 
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Q~-g~!~t!_~~~-~Y~!~Y!~!-~~g~g!~~~~-!~f2~~~t~2~-~~~t!~~: Many 
institutions have record-keeping systems that primarily produce 
reports required for government agencies or donors such as loan 
disbursements by type, size, enterprise funded and size and type of 
borrower. This information clogs information channels and provides 
little useful data for managers on income, expenses, cost of funds 
and quality of loan portfolio. Likewise, central banks emphasize 
global measures such as deposits mobilized and loans made, but many 
do not collect and analy2e income and expense data to evaluate 
institutional viability. Management information systems must be 
restructured by stripping away nonessential information on loan 
targeting and concentrating instead on data collection to monitor the 
financial health of institutions [Graham and Firestine]. The 
introduction of micro-computer hardware and software systems could 
greatly facilitate data management and analysis within the central 
bank and individual institutions. Careful audit and inspection 
functions must be performed by the central bank to maintain customer 
confidence in financial institutions. 
g~_£E~~~~-~-E~~~~!~h-~~9-~~~!~~!s~!_S~E~e!!!t~~ Development of 
viable RFMs requires research and analysis at three levels: a> rural 
households and firms, b) financial institutions and c> national 
monetary and credit issues. Institutions must be developed and 
strengthened to undertake this work. Research will be needed in many 
LICs on topics such as: inflation proJections for interest rate 
analysis, market studies to identify consumer preferences regarding 
financial instruments, design and evaluation of savings campaigns, 
scope and magnitude of potential financial services for specific 
rural market areas, incentives for improved institutional efficiency 
and demand factors that influence the allocation of credit. This 
broad range of issues requires researchers within the central bank 
and financial institutions, and private and public research 
institutions. The central bank must develop capacity to conduct 
research on issues for which it is best qualified, suggest where and 
how research on other related issues is institutionalized and 
identify key topics for study as the £inancial sector undergoes 
change and growth. 
E~-Q~~!9~-~~~-£e~~~£!_!~~!~!~9-~~~-~~sn~!s~!-~~~i~t~~s~-E~29r8-~§~ 
Personnel problems of £inancial institutions have led to research on 
training requirements and the content of training courses CRobertsJ. 
Manpower constraints will become even more serious when single 
function institutions broaden their scope of financial services. New 
skills will be necessary when savings institutions require expertise 
£or lending activities, and lending institutions need personnel 
trained in deposit procedures. Loan officers must learn to evaluate 
loan applications baaed on creditworthiness rather than merely 
following regulations for targeting enterprises. Demands on managers 
will increase when financial viability becomes an important 
evaluation criterion. Managers will need to design loan programs and 
develop criteria for creditworthiness instead of simply following 
instructions issued for lending programs. Productivity measures will 
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be needed to quantify costs of operations, profits or surplus per 
unit/branch, transactions coats and margins required to cover costs. 
Decisions will be required on which branches to expand. the rate to 
expand new services, the minimum size of market area £or opening a 
new unit/branch and new innovations for lending and deposit 
mobilization. The central bank can design some of these concepts. 
suggest standards, develop courses and materials for staff training 
and arrange technical assistance to transfer ideas used successfully 
elsewhere. 
52. Governments undertaking financial reforms will find that at least 
two issues in addition to bank operations will affect success. The 
first concerns policies and programs that affect the magnitude and 
variability of farm profits and farmers' debt repayment capacity [Von 
Pischke C1984)]. Demand for loans, loan recovery and the financial 
strength of rural financial institutions are directly related to 
incomes of farm households. Steps have been taken in some LICs to 
change policies that undervalue agricultural products, but more are 
required. Additional long-term investments must be made in research 
and extension to improve agricultural technology. Irrigation, price 
and marketing policies, crop guarantee and insurance programs and 
other measures are needed to combat production and income 
variability. The second issue concerns use of mobilized funds. The 
expanded pool of rural deposits will provide greater opportunities 
for rural and urban investors to successfully compete for loans. 
Private investors will be crowded out 0£ the financial markets, 
however, if governments choose to appropriate these deposits by 
raising mandatory reserve requirements, by increasing targets £or 
nonagricultural loans, or by setting high interest rates for 
government securities. If this happens, the positive impact of 
deposit mobilization will be limited to improved income £or rural 
savers, but with little improvement in the magnitude of private 
investment. 
~-Q!!!~~~~~-~2!~_!2~-!~t~~~~t!2~~!-~g~~~!~~ 
53. International agencies can play an important supportive role in 
rural financial reforms by limiting their support to governments 
trying seriously to create viable rural financial institutions. 
There will be limited scope and funds £or traditional large scale 
transfers of funds for on-lending through RFM and other proJects. 
Such transfers, in fact, diminish or destroy the incentives needed 
for reform. If a transfer of funds to agriculture is desirable for 
foreign exchange purposes, the funds should be directed towards 
easing adJuatment problems in countries undertaking financial 
reforms, towards investments in agricultural research, extension, 
education, markets, or other infrastructure which increase the demand 
for loans. Important proJects of small to medium scale can be 
developed to strengthen central banks and other financial 
institutions, to subsidize start-up coats £or institutions broadening 
their financial services, to develop research capacity, and to fund 
experiments to teat financial innovations. Foreign exchange may be 
useful for technical assistance to transfer technology and procedures 
.. 
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from successful institutions in other countries. and £or programs to 
develop and operate regional training and research centers. Selected 
expenditures for foreign manufactured equipment and supplies may be 
important for new ir1formation systems. An active program is nended tu 
facilitate the i nternfll ion al exchange of ideas and l•"snona 1 earned 
from financial reform programs. 
~2~!~2~i~9-~!~!2~~~~~~ 
54. Programs to reform and broaden RFMa require monitoring to 
determine the rate of progress, the bottlenecks or constraints on 
implementation, and policy changes that are needed. Monitoring 
requires a) the selection of a set of monitoring criteria, and b> the 
collection and analysis of appropriate data. The primary criterion 
for evaluation of many RFM proJects in their early stages of 
implementation is the amount of funds lent. Later, when loan 
collection problems begin to develop, the criterion of loan recovery 
is added. After a proJect is completed, ex post evaluations 
frequently try to measure loan impact on borrowers. The emphasis is 
largely on the borrower at all three stages, rather than on the 
financial health of the institution. Five criteria are proposed here 
for use in monitoring performance.3 
~~--~~~~~~~ Financial institutions provide services to customers, 
so a logical evaluation criterion is the number of people with 
regular access to these services. In rural areas, this criterion 
implies monitoring the number of persons who regularly use deposit 
accounts and receive loans. The geographic spread of persons with 
access to financial institutions and their income and wealth 
characteristics will be important to measure. An approximation 0£ 
trends in access can be obtained by periodically constructing a 
pro£ile 0£ users drawn from a sample 0£ rural savings and loan 
accounts. When £inancial services become more complex and rural 
households use more than one institution, an occasional field survey 
0£ households may be needed to determine the number and 
characteristics of people who do not use any financial institutions. 
§~--~~~!~9§_~9Q!!!~~t!9~~ The second per£ormance criteria is 
savings mobilization, and it should be considered in several 
dimensions. The aggregate amount 0£ deposit and eavinge accounts in 
rural areas is important because it influences the supply of funds 
available for lending. Trends in deposits of individual institutione 
may reflect success in employing different methods in savings 
mobilization. Measuring trends in total deposits in a given market 
will show the extent to which competition for savings results in 
dieintermediation among institutions rather than a net increase in 
aggregate deposits. 
g~--~2~~-!~~2~~!Y· Loan repayment is indicative 0£ the value 
borrowers place on maintaining long-term relationships with an 
institution. Borrowers who value the relationship and desire future 
loans will make every effort to keep existing loans current and will 
work closely with lenders to resolve delinquencies. High arrears 
rates may reflect unusual production and marketing problems, but may 
also reflect poor quality of loan services and high borrower 
transactions costs for new loans. Therefore, monitoring loan 
recovery and the age-wise structure of delinquencies is a useful 
proxy for quality of service. Loan recovery data also are important 
because of the impact of delinquency and default on institutional 
viability. 
Q~_g!!!~!~~~Y· The fourth criteria is efficiency because the 
human and physical resources used in financial intermediation have 
alternative economic uses. For management decisions, efficiency 
measures are needed within an institution, such as number of deposit 
or loan accounts per bank officer and profits or surplus per unit af 
savings mobilized or loans made. The long-term ob]ective of 
financial intermediation is to increase the real rate of interest 
paid on deposits and decrease the real cost of loans. Transactions 
costs influence the net return received by savers and the total cost 
of borrowing, so they are important efficiency measures to monitor. 
Transactions costs borne by the institution determine the minimum 
spread required to cover its coats. It is useful to monitor 
transactions costs of both institutions and their customers because a 
decrease in one may be offset by an increase in the other. 
Differences in transactions coats among institutions may suggest ways 
for high coat institutions to reduce coats. 
g~ __ JD§t!t~~!Q~~1-Y!~Q!!!~Y~ The final criterion refers to an 
institution's ability to maintain self-sustaining growth. This 
measure is affected by performance in the other four criteria. An 
institution that provides access to a large number of users, 
mobilizes a large share of the resources it lends, has a high 
recovery rate on loans, and is efficient will likely achieve 
long-term growth and stability. Profits or surplus are traditional 
measures of viability, but other indices are the amount of government 
subsidies received and the minimum spread between cost of funds and 
loan rates required to cover costs and lending risks. Measures of an 
institution's ability to withstand adversity are also useful to 
monitor such as debt to equity ratio and reserve for bad debts. 
VIII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS. 
55. Many LICa face two important interrelated challenges involving 
rural finance. One challenge is to increase the national savings 
rate and reduce dependence on external savings. The second is to 
improve the per£ormance 0£ their RFMs. The central argument of thie 
paper is that greater deposit mobilization, especially in rural 
areas, can contribute to meeting both challenges. 
56. MaJor efforts have been made in the past two decades to 
strengthen rural finance. Unfortunately, the emphasis has been 
limited largely to channelling cheap credit to farmers. Although the 
obJectives are commendable - increase farm income, accelerate 
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technological change, expand exports - the results have been modest 
compared to expectations. More seriously, the approach actually 
undermines mobilization of domestic resources and destroys the 
viability of financial institutions. Any benefits received by target 
groups and beneficiaries from loans come at a high cost to the 
susta1ned development 0£ rural financial institutions. Typically the 
initial experimental pro3ects never expand beyond benefitting a 
fairly small group of farmers compared to the large rural population 
that would benefit from reliable £inancial services. 
57. Awareness is growing that the traditional agricultural credit 
approach has serious shortcomings, but the nature of the reforms to 
be made are not yet clearly understood. This paper argues that 
deposit mobilization provides the cornerstone for reform. Increased 
attention to deposit mobilization will force institutions to provide 
more attractive savings alternatives for rural households, will place 
high quality customer services as a high priority. will require· 
institutions to more carefully allocate loans on the basis of debt 
repayment capacity, and will stress loan recovery in order to protect 
customer deposits. A stronger deposit base will free institutions 
from some 0£ the current political influence in lending and loan 
recovery decisions, and will make them more independent of the 
vagaries of government and donor support. 
58. Financial reform will be difficult, complex and long term. Many 
important technical issues must be resolved and significant changes 
will be required in the operations of lending institutions. The 
central bank must assume a key role in setting policies, providing 
guidance and conducting research on constraints and problems of rural 
financial institutions. Political issues will also be important. 
Strong vested interests have developed to preserve the status quo: 
the select few £armers who receive the subsidized loans, the 
politicians who gain favor by granting loans and ignoring repayment, 
the bank officials who receive promotions through meeting lending 
quotas, and the donor agency sta££ who are rewarded for the 
e££iciency with which they transfer large amounts 0£ assistance funds 
to recipient countries. These interests provide plenty 0£ reasons 
£or pessimism about the prospects for re£orm. 
59. There are, however, encouraging signs that are supportive of a 
£undamental reorientation in approach to rural finance. One is the 
large volume 0£ research available £rom several sources which 
documents the shortcomings 0£ the cheap credit approach. The second 
is that the donors no longer have a large amount 0£ £unds available 
£or such pro3ects. Third, financial problems are receiving great 
attention at the policy level because 0£ LIC indebtedness and a £ew 
highly publicized £ailures 0£ banking institutions in several 
countries. Fourth, there is a groundswell 0£ support in many LICa 
£or policy re£orma which give market forces greater scope in resource 
allocation, which reduce the role 0£ government in setting prices. 
and which place greater reliance on private rather than public sector 
institutions. 
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60. The challenge for donors is to £ind ways to meet their legitimate 
concerns for equity within this changing economic and political 
environment. They have an excellent opportunity to influence the 
outcome of financial reform, and they should concentrate their 
efforts in three areas. First, they should focus financial sector 
support on those countries that are seriously undertaking reform 
rather than scatter resources on loan programs in countries where 
conditions prevent ael£-auatained expansion of pilot ef£orts. 
Second, donors should channel scarce technical and financial 
resources into easing the adJustment problems that countries and 
institutions confront when conducting reforms. Third, they should 
encourage and help evaluate innovations that will lead to 
self-sustained development of financial services in rural areas 
recognizing that secure deposit services are as important for some 
rural households as loans are for others. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This paper draws heavily from a draft paper recently prepared by 
the author for FAO entitled "Deposit Mobilization for Rural 
Lending". I would like to acknowledge with appreciation those 
friends and colleagues who have influenced my thinking most about 
rural finance: Dale W Adams, Paulo F. C. de ArauJo, Carlos E. Cuevas, 
Cristina C. David, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Douglas H. Graham, Jerry R. 
Ladman, Donald W. Larson, Robert C. Vogel and J. D. Von Pischke. I 
also want to recognize the important support provided to OSU over the 
yeara by the Agency £or International Development and pro)ect 
officers, Cliff Barton, Robert E. Firestine and Sandra Frydman 
Henderson. The views expressed in this paper are my own and may not 
necessarily be shared by AID nor by the persona identified above. 
2. Nominal interest rates (i) refer to those set in loan and deposit 
contracts. Real interest rates <r> refer to the difference between 
nominal interest rates and the rate of inflation <p>, frequently 
calculated as simply i-p. When price changes are greater than 
nominal interest rates, the return on deposits or coat of loans can 
be negative in real terms. 
3. This section draws on a recent paper by Adams <1985> in which 
four variables are proposed for use in monitoring programs with an 
emphasis on lender viability: a) number of people with regular access 
to financial services, b) transactions costs, c) quality of services 
provided and d) savings mobilization. 
. . 
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